Most scholars argue that 'race' has no relation to human nature. A minority contend that it does. I argue that 'race' is a cultural category which can become an embodied part of the human experience. This embodiment helps account for the power of the idea of race.
'blood' in their veins are classifiable as black. In fact the situation was historically and remains a good deal more complex than this simple dualism suggests, but for the purposes of this illustrative contrast it will suffice. In Latin America, the category 'black' (often termed negro in Spanish and negro or preto in Portuguese) certainly exists, but is usually only assigned to people of fairly evident African descent. Various terms denoting mixed-ness are used for the majority of people who fall between those individuals who are deemed typically black, white or indigenous. This contrast between the USA and Latin America is due to complex historical processes linked to the differing ways these territories were colonized by the English and the Iberians. The contrast demonstrates that racial identities are constructions that have emerged over time, shaped by social forces. 1 Another example reinforces this proposition. In South Africa, under apartheid, individuals were classified into one of four racial categories which defined many of their social and legal rights. If a man classified by the authorities as 'Black' (African) thought he was 'Coloured' (mixed black-white origin), he could take his case to a tribunal where not only his appearance and heritage, but also his residence, behaviour and public reputation would be examined to establish the 'correct' classification. In this way, a person might change racial identity during a lifetime -indeed, sometimes more than once. Sisters born of the same parents might end up in different categories (see Watson, 1970 ; see also Marx, 1998 ).
Yet if races are socially defined phenomena, there is still, in many circles -including some scientific ones -a powerful belief that race has some significant roots in human nature, beyond the superficial aspects of skin colour and hair texture. My aim in this article is to help explain the power of the belief that race is a real and important aspect of human nature, without relying on deterministic theories about race. I see this as a contribution to the recent resurgence of interest in the issue of race among anthropologists (F. Harrison, 1998; Mukhopadhyay and Moses, 1997 ; see also Wade, 2002) . In what follows, I will first outline three theories about the kind of significance race might be said to have. I will then examine these theories in more depth, before going on to make some suggestions of my own about the relation between race and human nature.
THREE THEORIES ABOUT THE SIGNIFICANCE OF RACE
The first theory is about human genetic variation. It is clear that human beings vary biologically in some very apparent ways. The question is whether that variation can be sorted into a discrete number of definite categories, called 'races', each of which has a set of common features, such as skin colour, hair type, blood group or aspects of genetic make-up. If this were so, the concept of race might be a useful way of talking about the variation in human nature. In fact, this is exactly the meaning of race that dominated in western scientific and popular circles throughout the 19th and for a good part of the 20th centuries. Races were not thought to be 'social constructions', but to be rooted in human biology. Today, some people continue to use the term in this biological way. There are scientists who believe that 'race' is still useful as an analytic concept to describe human genetic diversity. Lieberman and Reynolds (1996: 158) found in a 1985 survey that 70 per cent of biologists specializing in animal behaviour and 50 per cent of biological anthropologists believed that biological races existed in the human species (see also Entine, 2001 ).
The second, more controversial theory argues that the superficial variation in outward appearance correlates with other human characteristics. Skin colour is powerfully influenced by particular inherited genes; the question is whether those same genes, or some correlated part of the genetic complement, also significantly influences cognitive abilities such as 'intelligence' or perhaps capabilities such as strength or speed. This second theory went hand in glove with the first and was also dominant in the 19th century and into the 20th century. A 'race' was definable not only in terms of aspects of biology such as skin colour and facial features, but also in terms of moral and intellectual characteristics. Today, there are still some psychologists who believe that 'race' is a real biological entity that correlates with intelligence, a proposition I discuss briefly later. It is this second theory about race that has provoked very heated debate in the social sciences, since it impinges directly on the cardinal liberal belief that all humans are born equal; or, at least, that although there may be a good deal of variation in terms of the intellectual abilities of individuals, such variation is not systematically divided up between classes, types or geographical sub-sets of humans. The argument, about the greater importance of individual rather than group variation, is a main plank in the critique of this theory about race and has been deployed by biologists and biological anthropologists for decades (Brown and Armelagos, 2001) .
A slightly less alarming variation on this second theory is the proposition that there are other human traits which have a significant genetic basis, such as a predisposition to certain medical conditions or specific physical abilities, such as sprinting power or longdistance running ability -although the importance of the genetic influence in these traits is often not agreed upon. The argument then goes that these traits also correlate importantly with something that can usefully be called 'race' (Entine, 2001; Satel, 2001) . Entine (2001) , for example, argues that if we accept that Africans and their descendants in the African diaspora are genetically predisposed to contract sickle-cell anaemia, then why can we not also accept that the success of East African long-distance runners and Eurasian power-lifters can also be explained partly by genetics (for a critique see Kohn, 1995) .
The third theory about race holds that, whatever human genetic variation may exist, this cannot be usefully described in terms of race and that race is an idea, which has no biological significance in influencing human potential. Its status as an idea, however, does not detract from its immense social significance. Even if race has absolutely no biological basis in human nature, people are clearly prepared to discriminate against others they define as racially distinct. The USA, South Africa and Nazi Germany stand as some of the most evident examples of this in the 20th century. To justify their discrimination in such cases, racists will often appeal, either publicly or privately, to doctrines of the genetic determination of human potential. This third theory is based on the currently accepted idea that 'races' are social constructions, but recognizes that this does not prevent race being a very important and often deeply rooted notion that affects people's behaviour and life chances in significant ways.
Let us look in more detail at these three arguments about the social significance of race.
'RACES' AS BIOLOGICAL ENTITIES INFLUENCING HUMAN POTENTIAL
The first theory -that human physical variation can be usefully divided up into things called 'races' -is the most easily refuted. In the 19th and the early 20th centuries, it was widely held by scientists and intellectuals that human beings could be divided up into a small number of more or less mutually exclusive races. In addition, according to these doctrines of so-called scientific racism, each race not only looked different but had a different essential nature which determined in large part the intellectual and moral potential of its members. In pursuit of this agenda, scientists spent whole careers measuring skulls in order to define such races and prove that the white or Caucasian race had the biggest -and hence the best -brains.
From the early 20th century, some scientists began to show that it was actually impossible to divide humans up in this way. Features such as head size could change over a generation, determined more by diet than heredity. 2 No set of biological characteristics could be isolated that allowed the demarcation of even reasonably convenient boundaries among humans. Human evolution has also been a history of migration and constant intermixture between populations, blurring biological boundaries and creating 'genoclines' or gradually varying distributions of genetic material. If many biological anthropologists today still talk in terms of biological races, it is most likely a roughand in my view misguided -shorthand for the way some aspects of human appearance vary over the world's surface. 3 During the same period, the second theory about race was also being attacked: the idea that differences in appearance correlated with basic moral and mental functions. This, however, has been a much more difficult argument to scotch and persists today, mostly in controversies about race and IQ, in which 'hereditarians' such as Arthur Jensen, Hans Eysenck, J. Phillipe Rushton and most recently Richard Herrnstein and Charles Murray line up against 'environmentalists' such as Stephen J. Gould, James Flynn, Leon Kamin and Steven Rose. 4 It is worth noting that, outside the academic world, a 1990 survey in the USA showed that 53 per cent of non-blacks believed black Americans to be less intelligent that whites, although the survey did not ask if they thought the difference was genetically determined (Kohn, 1995: 115) .
It is a complex debate, highly polemical and replete with statistical point and counterpoint which cannot easily be summarized here. Suffice to say that, although blacks in the USA routinely score lower than whites on IQ tests (by about 10-15 points on a scale on which most people score between 85 and 140), and although many scientists accept that some part of intelligence is inherited, this does not mean blacks are innately less intelligent than whites: the difference in the IQ scores could just as well be caused by environmental influences as genetic ones. The mere persistence of a score differential between blacks and whites is not evidence of an innate cause for that difference. Also, the black-white differential is decreasing in the USA and is much less evident in the UK, again suggesting environmental influences. Furthermore, 'IQ' itself is a vague and difficult construct. As a rule, IQ scores everywhere gradually go up over time, sometimes apparently in relation to improved diet and social conditions, at other times not obviously in relation to anything at all. Between 1972 and 1982, Dutch 18-year-olds gained an average 9 points in IQ for reasons it is hard to discern. If IQ is such a variable thing, it is difficult to imagine that it is hardwired into the genes (Jones, 1997: 197-9) . Today most scientific authorities reject a connection between race and IQ, as do popular works of reference (e.g. Microsoft's Encarta, Encyclopaedia Britannica). The fact is that, genetically, humans have more similarities than differences.
The variation on the second theory, which links medical conditions and certain physical traits (or physical traits assumed to have a genetic basis) to race, is also a difficult area of research and debate. It is clear that evolution has spread genetic material around the globe in uneven ways. Although it is widely reported that humans are 99.9 per cent the same, it seems that the remaining 0.1 per cent of variability can result in significant differences. It is accepted that some traits with a clear genetic basis, such as sickle-cell anaemia, lactose intolerance and low tolerance to alcohol, have a certain global geographical distribution. The problem comes when such traits -and others for which the genetic basis may be less clear, such as sprinting power or long-distance running ability -are linked to something called 'race'. It may well be that sickle-cell anaemia is more common among Africans, but that does not mean all Africans are more predisposed to it and it may also be that other non-Africans can be affected by it (Tapper, 1999) . And even if it is the case that most US sprinters are black and that they tend to have a high percentage of energy efficient 'fast-twitch' muscle fibres, a trait that has a genetic basis and that is said to be common among West Africans (Entine, 2001) , what does this tell us, in biological terms, about 'race'? Not all blacks are West Africans. West Africans can hardly be said to constitute a 'race'. It is not clear whether the tendency is common to all West Africans (even if this were a self-evident category in the first place, especially given a history of in and out migration). In short, while it is certainly interesting to know about genetically based advantages for certain sports, and about the frequency distributions of the genetic basis for such advantages, this does not tell us anything about the biology of 'race'.
THE PERSISTENCE OF THE IDEA OF RACE: HISTORY AND POLITICS
Despite the weakness of claims about the location of the power of race in human nature, the third theory about race argues, the idea of race continues to hold great social sway over people's imaginations. It is a tremendously powerful way of thinking about human difference, partly because it appeals to ideas about human nature. It seems to root difference in natural essences that are transmitted across generations, essences that usually make themselves visible on the body and that are also thought to influence people's characters and behaviour. The third theory about the significance of race argues that race has become deeply embedded in western -and some non-western -ways of thinking primarily because of historical processes. 5 It is necessary to note that, within this broad theoretical approach, there is a good deal of variety and disagreement (see Hirschfeld, 1996) . Some scholars see properly racial thinking as emerging in the 18th century (Smedley, 1998) ; others trace the concept back further (Banton, 1987; Goldberg, 1993) . It is generally agreed, however, that the term 'race' emerged in several European languages just at the time when European peoples were encountering peoples on other continents and, usually, subjecting them to some form of domination. Race and racial thinking are intimately connected to colonialism and imperialism. They have been continuously used to justify and rationalize exploitation and inequality. Although the notion of race predated the transatlantic slave trade, this trade and the associated institutions of slavery in the Americas and the Caribbean helped consolidate the idea. But the idea of race was not tied only to slavery. In fact, when slavery began to be dismantled, the notion of race became even more powerful, helping to justify the oppression of nonwhite people by European colonial powers all over the Americas, in Africa, Asia and Australia. In sum, the close relation between ideas of race and social inequality is part of the reason why, in this view, race persists as a way of thinking about certain sorts of human difference.
Colonial domination has now mostly ended, at least in terms of the maintenance by European nations of imperial colonies that they rule directly. But, according to this third approach, ideas about race are nevertheless still closely connected to patterns of social inequality, causing discrimination and exclusion in many different contexts. In Europe today, it has been argued, ideas about race are linked to concepts of the nation. The national identities of countries such as Britain, France and Germany are built around the often hidden assumption that British, French and German people are fundamentally white and that non-white citizens of these countries are somehow not true nationals and not deserving of the same treatment as white nationals -or even white immigrants. 6 Various scholars argue that the idea of race is a slippery customer, changing chameleon-like with its historical context, but not disappearing (e.g. Goldberg, 1993) . For example, 'race' as conceived in the British Race Relations Act (1976) is very different from 'race' as current in 1900: the 1976 Act makes no mention of biology and uses the notion of race to combat racism, rather than catalogue human variation; it outlaws discrimination not just by race, but also by ethnicity and nationality. This mirrors a recent trend, noted by various theorists, for a discourse of 'race' to blend into, or even be replaced by a discourse of 'ethnicity'; talk of 'culture' thus supersedes talk of 'biology'. Various observers have noted that differences between people in Britain and elsewhere may be talked of as ethnic or cultural rather than racial or biological. 7 In my view, it actually remains to be demonstrated that this shift is a general pattern, as opposed to something confined to the public domain where explicit reference to race is often avoided in the supposed interests of political correctness (see Wade, 2002: Ch. 5) . My hunch is that many people actually continue to think about race in terms of physical, biological differences (e.g. 'blood'), even if it is far from clear exactly how they conceive of such differences. In any case, while the word 'race' may now be heard less often in public circles, the notion of race, far from being eliminated, is simply broadened. Differences between people can still be seen as both physical and cultural, and each realm acts as a signal for the other. Different appearances are thought to indicate different cultures and different cultures seem to suggest different natures. Wieviorka (1997: 142) argues that cultural racism still involves some reference to the realm of 'nature, biology, genetic heritage or blood'. (And, if my hunch is correct, the continuing presence of unspoken assumptions about 'blood' would only reinforce this cross-over.)
In the third approach to the significance of race, the persistence of the idea of race is also seen as related to its use in anti-racist political struggles and identity politics. In the post-war USA, blackness became an increasingly public and active idea around which to organize politically in a struggle for civil rights. The idea that 'black is beautiful' and that black Americans might pursue something called 'black power' not only helped redefine the meaning of blackness in the USA, with repercussions across the globe, it has also kept alive the notion that black people in the USA have something in common, that race -even if understood as a social construction -has an important political and social meaning. In Britain, the importance of race as a political category has grown since the Second World War and continues to be an important referent in discourses of citizenship, multiculturalism and human rights. Such anti-racist and identity politics struggles have, of course, been the target of critiques which, among other things, point out that such struggles can end up reifying and perpetuating racial categories (e.g. Gilroy, 2000) .
In sum, for theorists of the third approach, race retains its power for the reasons cited here, despite the fact that it has no real biological significance.
IS IT 'NATURAL' TO THINK RACIALLY?
The durability of the idea of race has led some theorists to a hybrid theory which, while it retains some of the basic argument of the third approach to race, reintroduces important elements that derive from the first theory. This hybrid theory suggests that humans are naturally predisposed to think 'racially'. The argument is that evolution has equipped us with a brain that tends to notice physical difference and make assumptions about people's essential natures. From this perspective, the 'human race' developed racial thinking through natural selection, which made people favour those who looked like themselves because similar appearance betokens some shared genes. Hence discriminating in favour of people who look like oneself is a way of increasing 'inclusive fitness', that is, of increasing the dissemination of the genetic material that one has oneself (see Van den Berghe, 1979) . Here is yet another attempt to ground race in nature, this time on the assumption that all humans constitute a 'race' and thus share some basic essence -in this case, the tendency to divide people up into 'natural races'. No claim is made that 'races' exist as real biological units, yet a claim is made that a real biological tendency exists to see humans as divided into 'races'. This seems to me fundamentally misguided. It operates on the assumption that the physical differences westerners call racial -which are generally those of skin colour, hair texture and facial form -have universally been the most important differences that people notice and use to think about others. But, for example, prior to the Europeans' early modern encounters with other continents, darkness of skin was generally considered to be a trait indicating masculine virility (Frost, 1990) . Skin colour was noticed and commented on, but not as a way of thinking about the geographical or territorial difference that the evolutionist argument is built on. These specifically racial ways of thinking clearly emerged from the 14th century onwards.
One sophisticated example of this attempt to reground race into human nature is the work of Lawrence Hirschfeld (1996) . 8 He argues that there is a basic process of human cognition which is specific to the way people think about other humans. This cognitive process relies on the assumption that 'humans can be partitioned into enduring types on the basis of highly correlated clusters of naturally grounded properties ' (1996: 38) . The assumption that humans are divided up into natural kinds, each with its natural characteristics, is what Hirschfeld calls the race concept. This basic cognitive assumption is manifested in specific and widely varying historical ways, which Hirschfeld calls modes of racial thinking. Examples of racial thinking include the well-known Europeanbased theories about differences between blacks and whites in the New World, but also English discrimination against the Irish and patterns of anti-Semitism. These varied forms of racial thinking are based on a race concept which categorizes people in terms of assumed natural differences. In response to various criticisms, Hirschfeld (1997: 74-5) emphasizes that 'race is not a natural category of the mind'. It is just that 'race has in itself -in its psychological core -a naturalizing and essentializing potency' which means that humans, with their innate predisposition to create natural categories, tend to use race. This, however, seems to suggest that 'race' is an independent entity, separate from, but attractive to, the human mind. Hirschfeld (1996) attempts to demonstrate his thesis with data drawn from experiments with children which show that even pre-schoolers see 'racial' features such as skin colour as being more important than other observable features (such as the trappings of occupation) in terms of salience, transmissibility to offspring and influencing behaviour. According to Hirschfeld, this demonstrates that a tendency to classify people into 'natural kinds' is innate in humans. Unfortunately, all Hirschfeld's data come from the USA, apart from one experiment with French children. This badly undermines his theory since one could equally well account for his findings by arguing that even very young children can pick up the important social categories of the society in which they live -and both the USA and France, although different in terms of racial structures and ideologies, surely have very obvious racial divides. Hirschfeld interestingly demonstrates that young children have difficulty placing other individual children into a given racial category. That is, the physical appearance of other children is not enough to enable a child to classify them racially. For Hirschfeld, this indicates that children are cognitively predisposed to have these types of natural categories of human beings, even if they cannot place individuals in them. But this does not necessarily follow. One could equally well argue that children pick up the basic categories from their social environment and learn later to assign individual people to them -a skill which, after all, takes some practice and can also elude adults, especially if they are not accustomed to a given social context. I would reject, then, the idea that the persistence and power of ideas of race derive from some natural tendency to 'think racially'.
IS BIOLOGY COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT? THE NOTION OF EMBODIMENT
If the durability of the idea of race is rooted in politics and economics, then the biology of race is, in itself, irrelevant. Certainly I, along with many others, would reject the arguments (a) that there are such things as biological races; (b) that there are innate biological features linked to racial identity which influence a person's developmental potential; and (c) that humans are biologically or cognitively predisposed to see and think racially.
Yet I am not sure this exhausts the debate about race and human nature. If racial identity is marked on the body and it is in our human nature to be embodied -to live in bodies -then race must, in some sense, be related to our nature. This may seem like a dangerously regressive step. My point, however, is to see human nature not as something pre-formed and determinate, but as something which is itself malleable and emergent (see Wade, 2002) . This has rather little to do with genetics, but it does have to do with biology. The pairing of 'race' with 'biology' is almost taboo in many social science circles today, but, I would suggest, this is mainly because biology is assumed to equate only to genetics -and a rather determinist sort of genetics at that. Kandel (1998) notes that social scientists often mistakenly believe that biologists think that biological processes are strictly determined by genes, yet recent biological understandings of genetics are far removed from the more determinist ideas about gene action that characterized theories of the early 20th century (Keller, 1995) . And despite the fact that 'in contemporary biology the centre is taken by genetic discourse' (Gilbert, 1995) , biology, of course, encompasses the entire organism in relation to its surroundings, a relation which includes processes of organic development. 9 An understanding of this might help us to grasp the continuing social and imaginative force of the idea of race.
We need to open our minds to a realm of biology that is about the development of the organism in its surroundings, including its social context, rather than about genetic determinisms, or even genetic interactions (although these should not be ignored, I am trying to make a rather different point). I am thinking in terms of what Goodman and Leatherman (1998: 25) call a 'new biocultural anthropology' that attempts to mediate between biological and cultural studies, that examines how human organic processes interact with social processes and that is resolutely opposed to the kind of reductionist and determinist thinking characteristic of sociobiology and evolutionary psychology. Mukhopadhyay and Moses (1997: 526) also call for an attempt to reunite 'culture and biology by embedding biology in society and culture'. Ingold (2000: 391) goes even further, undermining classic divisions between culture and biology by arguing that 'the differences we call cultural are indeed biological' because the organism, in all its physical and mental complexity, develops in and is shaped by a cultural context that it helps to constitute.
In essence, my argument is that the social realities of race become incorporated into the developing and changing body, seen as a biocultural entity. This embodiment of race helps us to understand the enduring power of race as an idea and also to grasp why people think about race in naturalizing ways. Part of the reason behind naturalization is clearly because people see that key racial signifiers are heritable (although not in rigidly predictable ways), but I argue that the ways in which race becomes part of the lived and observed body are also crucial to understanding the naturalizing aspects of racialized thinking.
In some ways, my argument recalls that of Boas who, in the early years of the 20th century, argued that among immigrants to the USA, head forms could change over time, without a change in descent (Boas, 1912; reprinted in Boas, 1966: 61-75) . He was concerned to challenge the whole concept of 'racial type', as it was being used in the racial and eugenic science of the period, showing that these purportedly stable and permanent types did not exist and that features said to be central to defining racial types, such as head size and form, were plastic and changeable over quite short time periods. But while Boas was beginning to undermine the whole notion of biological race (as conceived in the first and second theories about race, outlined earlier in this article), my concern is to argue that at least some of the enduring power of the idea of race is due to the way that the social realities of race become incorporated into the developing and changing body, seen as a biocultural entity. The idea that bodies are plastic is the same, but the theoretical significance given to that plasticity is rather different.
The idea of the embodiment of social processes is not a new one. The body has long been seen as a product of discursive regimes, although several scholars object that the materiality of the body is often lost in Foucauldian approaches to discourse (Butler, 1993; Shilling, 1993; Turner, 1994) . I am attracted to the approach of Shilling (1993: 114) who argues that the body is an unfinished project which is both constructed by and constructs social relationships. I also take as a guide Butler's remark that performance is a 'discursive mode by which ontological effects are installed' (cited in Gilroy, 1995: 17) , as it seems to me that this integrates nicely the discursive and the material.
Despite the extensive work on embodiment and performance, there is rather little exploration of themes of race and embodiment and I believe this is an interesting and fruitful area for investigation. 10 Some examples of the kind of approach I have in mind will help here. One study in the USA tackled the issue of why so many professional basketball players are black. One argument says that, as black men are discriminated against in the wider job market, they opt instead for sport. However, this study looked at how black men and white men grew up with basketball. Black men tended to play on crowded inner-city courts where competition for space was fierce and certain skills were selected for -dribbling, shooting under pressure and so on. Excellence in such skills was rewarded with more playing time on the court, creating a cycle of reinforcement. White men more often played on courts where the main problem was actually getting a full team together. They could develop skills individually, but often outside the normal game environment. Thus there was a tendency for black and white men to actually develop different bodies: the skills they had were learnt, but they were also ingrained into their neuronal circuits as body techniques (L. Harrison, 1995) . The point is that black men in this example are not 'by nature' good basketball players, if by 'nature' we mean a set of genetic predispositions. But, in these circumstances, they stand a good chance of becoming good basketball players -a chance also influenced, of course, by a great many other factors -in a way that is drummed into their bodies as unconscious skill, as a 'second nature'. 11 Such skills can be drummed into other, non-black bodies, but the social context makes it more likely that it will be black men whose bodies acquire them. The skills are durable, but they are not necessarily permanent. The process at work here is a biological process, as it concerns the development of the body (including the brain), but it is not a genetic process and, of course, the characteristics acquired by these sportsmen cannot be passed on genetically. 12 The social effect of this biocultural process is that it is very easy to think in naturalizing terms about the link between blackness and sporting ability. The idea of race is reinforced by and reinforces the process by which the social realities of sporting experience become ingrained into the body.
Another example comes from South America, from the Andes. Here, there are powerful, if shifting, distinctions made between 'Indians' and 'mestizos' (people of mixed descent). Indianness is indicated by a host of interacting social markers: appearance -in terms of both physiognomy and clothing -language, place of residence, occupation, and so on. One particular marker is going barefoot. A mestizo -or someone who wants to appear to be mestizo -will never go barefoot and anyone who does is very liable to be called an Indian (Orlove, 1998) . As anyone who has tried it will know, going barefoot is not a straightforward business if you stray beyond the lawn or the beach; you are likely to do some serious damage to your feet. Those who habitually go barefoot develop a foot that is physically quite different from those who normally wear shoes: it is a foot that is splayed, gnarled and with a thick and horny sole. Thus one of the indicators of Indianness actually becomes a physical -indeed biological, but not genetic -part of the body. A racial identity becomes embodied. Weismantel has pursued this kind of approach to race in her recent work in the Andes. She argues that it is in the interactions between bodies and the substances they ingest, the possessions they accumulate, and the tools they use to act on the world [that] we can really see race being made, and making the society around it. This kind of race is neither genetic nor symbolic, but organic: a constant, physical process of interaction between living things. (Weismantel, 2001: 266) Weismantel extends the idea of embodiment to include different kinds of accumulations -of possessions, clothes, and so on -which I find difficult to see as organic, in terms of the bodily organism that I have been discussing. But by the same token, she also puts into question what constitutes the realm of the organic body. Smell, for example, an exploration of which is the context for the quotation from Weismental just cited, is an interesting case, especially given the function of ideas about bodily odour in discourses of racial difference. Holding aside the use of perfumes and deodorants, body odour is still the result of many processes to do with genetics, lifestyle, diet, climate and so on. If a certain smell is stereotypically held to be linked to a certain 'race', then this might be a relevant example of the way social realities become embodied. However, certain smells might also be due to factors (use of wood fires, physical labour in certain environments, and so on) that are not the result of the shaping of the body itself as an organism -and it is this that interests me.
A further set of examples of the kind of process I am referring to comes from the domain of medicine and medical anthropology. It has long been noted that black men in the Caribbean and the Americas have higher blood pressure than non-black men. This is not a genetic predisposition since many African men have blood pressures the same as or lower than white Americans. There are many factors that influence blood pressure, but one argument is that the constraints and pressures that everyday racism places on American black men, frustrating the achievement of their ambitions, slowly but surely increases the chances of suffering from high blood pressure, especially in later life. Racism leaves its mark on the body, or more accurately, becomes part of the body (Dressler, 1996) . In later work, Dressler and his colleagues argue that skin colour per se does not correlate accurately to hypertension, but rather the degree to which individuals can achieve a sense of 'cultural consonance' or fit with local definitions of the good life. Dark-skinned men in Brazil with high levels of cultural consonance do not have high rates of hypertension. But overall, dark skin increases the chances of problems of cultural consonance and thus also hypertension (Dressler et al., 1999) . In short, it is the lived experience of frustration that becomes incorporated into the body as hypertension and that experience is more common among black men.
These examples show how racial identity becomes embedded in the body. But this does not mean that racial identity is therefore fixed and immutable. It is common to see racial identity as permanent because it is marked by physical signs such as skin colour, but if we understand the human body as a thing in process -an easy enough concept if we think of growing up and ageing -then we can see how people can also work on their bodies to alter their racial identity. Michael Jackson is perhaps an extreme example, but two of the techniques he has used, those of skin-lightening and hair-straightening, have been around for a long time and are widespread in the Americas and elsewhere.
On the other hand, of course, sun-tanning is also an industry which developed, not by coincidence, in the 1920s when 'blackness' was fashionable in European and North American circles on the back of a wave of artistic and intellectual interest in 'primitive' art and culture (Barkan and Bush, 1995) . White-skinned people trying to blacken their skin in the sun was part of a more general concern with bringing out what was perceived as the 'dark' side of the self: emotion, sensuality and so on.
In these examples, human nature is not static and determining of something else called culture; nor is it even a given, underlying basis which then shapes and moulds us as social beings. Rather, human nature is in process, being formed alongside culture. A person's human nature changes over time. Racial identity is not determined by physiognomy -much less are people's capabilities determined by 'racial' genes. But racial identities, formed through social and historical processes, are also embodied in real people whose bodies are formed by these processes and who work on their own bodies in the light of them. This approach to the notion of race and human nature, I contend, helps us understand why the idea of race has the force it does. Race is not part of human nature, if by this it is suggested that humans are determined by some supposed genetics of race; nor is it in our nature to think racially. But it is in our nature to be embodied and the social processes we live through -including the social processes that form racial identities -become part of our changing and developing bodies.
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